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Antitrust
Compliance Policy
A
trade association such as the Gas Processors Association ("GPA")
is an organization of competitors. As such, there are obvious
inherent antitrust implications in its operations and those
of its committees. Committees are continually counseled and
reminded to avoid any discussions or actions which have the
remotest antitrust implications. The GPA Legal Advisory Committee
or its individual members (hereinafter referred to as "Legal
Counsel") are available as counsel to other committees.
It is the responsibility of the committee or subcommittee
chairman to request Legal Counsel whenever needed.
To
assist GPA committees and their members, the Board of Directors
has adopted antitrust guidelines, developed by the Legal Advisory
Committee, which are summarized below. These guidelines are
not intended to substitute for the legal advise committee
members may receive from their own company's Legal Counsel.
Nor are they intended to be a comprehensive review of all
antitrust-related issues that may arise.
Trade
associations perform many useful and lawful functions, but
they present inherent antitrust dangers because of their nature
as organizations of competing concerns. The purpose of these
guidelines is to assist the GPA, its employees and members
not only to avoid violations of antitrust law, but to prevent
any appearance of violation. Each committee or section head
or any person conducting or holding a GPA meeting of any kind,
should be made aware of the guidelines and furnished a copy
thereof at least once a year.
I.
Application of Antitrust Laws to Association Activities
Trade
associations are subject to strict scrutiny under both federal
and state antitrust laws. Associations are particularly vulnerable
to attacks by federal and state antitrust enforcers, because
an association is, by its nature, a group of competitors joined
together for a common business purpose.
A
conviction for violating an antitrust law may result in stiff
fines for the association and its members, jail sentences
for individuals who participated in the violation, a consent
decree under which the association must operate, or a court
order disbanding the association.
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II.
The Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act
The
most important antitrust statutes relating to association
activities are Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Section 1 of the Sherman
Act prohibits "contracts, combinations, or conspiracies
. . . in restraint of trade." Since trade associations
are by definition "combinations", they are particularly
vulnerable.
The
Sherman Act prohibits any understanding affecting the price
of a product even if that understanding will benefit consumers.
Association
members must also remember that the Sherman Act is a criminal
conspiracy statute. Even if you are not an active participant
but simply attend a meeting where other members of the association
engage in an illegal discussion concerning price-fixing, you
may still be held criminally responsible, even though you
said nothing during the discussion. Mere attendance at such
a meeting may be sufficient to imply acquiescence in the discussion
and thereby make the individual liable to as great a penalty
as those who actively agreed to fix prices.
Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits "unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."
Unlike the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act reaches
anti-competitive acts committed by single persons or companies,
whether or not there is any agreement or "combination";
like the Sherman Act, it also covers joint actions.
The
FTC has broad power to determine what constitutes an unfair
method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice
under any given circumstances.
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III.
Penalties for Violation of the Antitrust Laws
Federal
antitrust laws may be enforced against associations, their
members, and staff both by government officials and by private
parties through treble damage actions. In both cases, penalties
are severe.
An
individual convicted of a criminal violation of the Sherman
Act may be fined as much as $1,000,000 and imprisoned for
up to ten years. A corporation convicted of such a criminal
offense may be fined as much as $100,000,000. However, under
alternative sentencing guidelines a higher fine may result
if the Court imposes a fine of twice the amount of the loss
caused to victims or twice the gain to the competitors.
Violation
of the Federal Trade Commission Act can result in issuance
of a cease and desist order, which will place extensive governmental
restraints on the activities of the association and its members.
Failure to obey such an order can result in penalties of as
much as $10,000 for each daily violation.
In
addition to governmental prosecution for a criminal or civil
violation, the association can face private action for treble
damages brought by competitors or consumers. A finding of
violation of an antitrust law in such a private action will
result in payment by the convicted party of treble damages
to the injured plaintiff.
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IV.
Antitrust Problem Areas of Association Activity
A.
"Per Se" Violations
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is construed as outlawing only
those arrangements which "unduly" or "unreasonably"
restrain interstate or foreign trade or commerce. Normally,
an arrangement is tested by its purpose and effect to determine
whether the restraint is "undue" or "unreasonable."
However, certain arrangements and activities are conclusively
presumed to be "unreasonable" in and of themselves
and deemed to be indefensible under all circumstances and,
therefore, illegal. These "per se" or automatic
violations include:
1.
Price Fixing. Experience shows that the price-fixing prohibitions
of the Sherman Act are most likely to be violated and the
government is most likely to strictly enforce. If price-fixing
is established, the association and its members may not
raise the defense that the prices set are reasonable or
that the ends sought through the price-fixing behavior are
worthy.
Prices must not be discussed before, at, or after GPA meetings.
"Price fixing" encompasses not only agreements
or combinations with competitors on a selling price, but
it may also include, for example, agreements to buy up surplus
goods, to adhere to a formula for determining prices, to
standardize discounts, to control raw material prices, to
control or standardize the price of services, and any other
agreement or combination which has the net result of affecting
the prices of goods or services. Furthermore, discussion
of even peripheral matters relating to price, such as credit
policies and terms of sale should also be avoided. It is
recognized that convention speakers may include reference
to prices, pricing or price trends or levels as part of
any address on another subject; however, speakers at the
convention should not be asked to speak on price. Discussions
or presentations regarding pricing policies must also be
avoided.
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2.
Agreement to Divide Customers or Allocate Territories. An
agreement or understanding among members of an association
to divide customers is, in and of itself, a criminal act.
Even an informal agreement whereby one member agrees to
stay our of another's territory will constitute a violation
of the antitrust laws.
3.
Agreement to Limit Supply. Any agreement or understanding
between competitors to restrict the volume of goods they
will produce or make available for sale is illegal.
4.
Boycotts. Any agreement or understanding between suppliers
and/or customers that they will not sell to, purchase from
or deal with particular outsiders is illegal.
5.
Tying Arrangements. Certain agreements imposed by a seller
who enjoys a substantial market position that its sale of
one product compels the buyer also to purchase a different
(or tied) product may be illegal.
B. Association Efforts to Influence Governmental Action
The Supreme Court has held that the Sherman Antitrust Act
is inapplicable to bona fide group efforts to influence legislative
action. Subsequent lower court decision have extended this
privilege (known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine) to include
influencing other governmental agencies besides legislative
bodies, but have left its bounds somewhat uncertain.
In general, one has a right to meet and collect necessary
information and to make joint presentations with respect to
governmental activities of common interest. This is conduct
which is protected to a much larger degree than are other
forms of joint activity. GPA and its Legislative and Regulatory
Affairs Committee should confine its activities to matters
relating to actual or prospective governmental policy-making
activities, i.e., legislative and regulatory rulemaking, unless
other activities are cleared by Legal Counsel.
It is frequently desirable to collect information which is
important to the subject of regulation, but which nevertheless
may be of value to one competitor as opposed to another. For
example, an inquiry might be made in dealing with a regulatory
body as to how some rule, law or regulation would affect each
company. When it is necessary to collect information of this
kind on an industry wide basis in order to meet effectively
a regulatory proposal or demand, the method of doing so should
be guided by Legal Counsel. For example the GPA may want to
use a consultant who obtains and organizes the particulars,
and the individual companies do not, or it may be desirable
that the companies communicate separately with a regulatory
agency. Information of competitive value, particularly including
information on the effect of regulation on individual companies,
should not be discussed or exchanged.
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C.
Guidelines For Drafting Standards, Specifications, Research
and Statistics
An association that develops voluntary industry standards,
specifications, research and statistics may face antitrust
problems if such activities favor some competitors and discriminate
against others. While major activities of this trade association
include standards, specifications, research and statistics,
such activities in and of themselves are not unlawful. However
the following guidelines should be adhered to.
1.
Research projects should be determined by the consent of
a large broad-based range of membership with due consideration
given to general industry benefit from the project.
2.
With respect to statistical activities, the principal antitrust
risks are that the government or a court might find that
such activities are part of a plan to fix or "stabilize"
prices, administer markets, limit production, or confer
a competitive advantage upon participants over others who
are excluded from access to the activities. Therefore, to
avoid antitrust involvement:
a.
Reports should not identify the statistics of individual
companies. This will help to avoid charges that production
quotas are being suggested, or pressures are being brought
on price cutters.
b. Discussions of company or regional statistics at meetings
should be avoided or limited to general terms. Prices,
costs, or other competitive or sensitive matters must
not be discussed.
c. GPA should not assess penalties for failure of members
to furnish data, nor should it use compulsory means, such
as inspection of members' books, to assure accuracy of
reports.
d. Particular sellers and customers should not be identified
or be capable of identification. Therefore the company
data or averages submitted should be from groups large
enough so that no individual company can determine another
company's data by "backing out" its own data.
e. There should be no editorial comment or analyses of
the data if it relates to prices, output or costs. Such
activities might be construed as exhortations to raise
prices or limit production.
f. There must be no limitation upon the freedom of a seller
to change his business policy or procedure at any time
and without prior notice to the Association, even though
the purpose of a proposed limitation is to assure that
data reported is accurate and not misleading.
g. The data disseminated should be made readily available
upon reasonable terms to both GPA members and non-members
and to both sellers and buyers.
h. While a fee may be required for non-members, it must
be reasonably related to the cost of gathering and disseminating
the data.
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3.
GPA frequently initiates programs to promulgate standards
for industry tests, measurements, criteria for quality or
to cooperate with private testing organizations or the Bureau
of Standards of the Department of Commerce in such undertakings.
Product standardization programs can be pro-competitive.
They may be pro-competitive and beneficial in such ways
as designating size, grade and quality standards so that
any purchaser may know, for example, that a "size 15
collar" on a shirt will be the same size regardless
of brand, or that a 2" x 4" shall be a minimum
of a certain size, etc. Standardization may also eliminate
hazardous products. On the other hand, standardization programs
may be anti-competitive if their purpose or effect is to
eliminate competition in quality, product improvement, or
research, or to eliminate or seriously disadvantage some
competitors or raise substantial barriers to entry into
the market such as standardizing upon a product that is
patented, or that requires scarce raw materials or that
will require some competitors to engage in extensive retooling,
etc. Since there is no general antitrust immunity for participating
in standardization of programs effectuated through any governmental
agency, the following guidelines should not be deviated
from without guidance from Legal Counsel:
a.
Do not enter into an agreement to adhere to industry standards.
Each company should preserve its freedom to conform or
not.
b. Do not adopt a standard that results in the elimination
of incentive for industry members to improve their products
or engage in research.
c. Do not enter into a standardization program where there
will be penalties, coercion or compulsion to enforce the
standards adopted.
d. Do not standardize on a product that requires use of
a patent or technical information not available on equal
terms to everyone in the industry.
e. Do not standardize on a raw material that is scarce
or difficult for non-members of the association to obtain.
f. Do not impose standards which may deprive consumers
of legitimate options, such as eliminating less expensive
product lines, or which may limit price competition.
4.
GPA initiates programs to promulgate specifications for
products. This activity is often a natural result of research
and the standards activity in which the GPA engages. The
comments and caveats in 3 above relating to the setting
of standards are equally applicable to the setting of specifications.
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C.
Miscellaneous Matters
1.
Position on Regulatory Matters. One should generally avoid
taking positions which might benefit one segment of the
gas processing industry at the expense of another.
2.
Meetings. Adequate minutes of all meetings on what transpired
should be kept. All notices for meetings, agenda and minutes
of meetings should be reviewed by Legal Counsel for conformance
to these guidelines. Agendas for all meetings should be
prepared and given to participants before the meetings.
All meetings of the Board of Directors shall have Legal
Counsel in attendance. Any meeting sponsored by GPA may
have Legal Counsel in attendance upon request of any GPA
member. Any committee which meets without having a genuine
agenda of business to be transacted is open to the charge
that it might have been meeting for something improper.
3.
Documents. Captions on letters to and from committees like
"confidential" (indeed anything suggesting secrecy),
should be avoided wherever possible. A suggestion of secrecy
or the destruction or retrieval of documents could be the
foundation for an adverse inference with respect to a paper
that otherwise is innocuous. Such actions should be avoided.
4.
Public Statements. Speeches, newsletters, press releases,
statements to governmental agencies, etc., prepared by GPA
spokesmen should be reviewed by Legal Counsel in advance.
5.
Pre and Post Meeting Conduct. Persons attending GPA meetings
must not discuss competitive or sensitive matters with each
other at any time.
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V.
How to Avoid Antitrust Problems
A.
General Operating Procedures
1.
Assuming that the members of GPA derive an economic benefit
from membership, the denial of membership to an applicant
may constitute a restraint of trade because such a denial
may limit the ability of the applicant to compete. Therefore,
membership criteria must be carefully established with a
view toward avoiding antitrust problems. Any action by the
GPA or its Board of Directors which has the effect of rejecting
a membership application should not become final without
approval by Legal Counsel.
2.
The Association should not restrict members from dealing
with non-members or limit access to information developed
by the Association, unless such limitation is firmly grounded
upon the need to protect trade secrets.
3.
All members of GPA should receive a copy of this Antitrust
Policy Statement.
4.
Legal Counsel should update members concerning antitrust
problems periodically and should formalize the Association's
antitrust compliance program.
5.
Legal Counsel should approve in advance all new association
programs or changes in existing programs that may have potential
antitrust implications. In this regard, special attention
should be given to statistical compilation and reporting
programs.
6.
All GPA meetings should be regularly scheduled, and members
should never hold "rump" meetings.
7.
An agenda should be prepared for each meeting of the Association,
and the agenda should be reviewed in advance by Legal Counsel.
8.
Legal Counsel should be present at all meetings of the Board
of Directors and at any other meeting at which sensitive
issues will be discussed.
9.
The minutes of all meetings should be approved by Legal
Counsel.
10.
The minutes of all GPA meetings should be accurate and should
not be signed if they have been doctored, are incomplete,
or have not been approved by Legal Counsel.
11.
The GPA should develop a formal document retention/disposal
program.
12.
No GPA staff member should have authority to communicate
with officials of the Federal Trade Commission, the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice or States' Attorneys
General without prior approval of Legal Counsel.
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B.
Self-Regulation
The GPA must not:
1.
Adopt regulations or policies which have price-fixing implications,
such as prohibitions on advertising of prices, or which
unreasonably restrict the ability of any member or group
of members to compete.
2.
Require members to refrain from dealing with a member who
has violated the Association's rules, policies or by-laws.
3.
Enforce any rule, policy or bylaw arbitrarily.
4.
Impose unreasonably severe penalties for violation of a
rule, policy or bylaw.
C.
Topics of Discussion Which Must be Avoided at Association
Meetings
1.
Current or future prices. (Great care must be taken in discussing
past prices).
2.
What constitutes a "fair" profit level.
3.
Possible increases or decreases in prices.
4.
Standardization or stabilization of prices.
5.
Pricing procedures.
6.
Cash discounts.
7.
Credit terms.
8.
Control of sales.
9.
Allocation of markets.
10.
Refusal to deal with a corporation because of its pricing
or distribution practices.
11.
Whether or not the pricing practices of any industry member
are unethical or constitute an unfair trade practice.
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VI.
A Case in Point
The
following discussion of an actual case highlights the potential
problems associated with association activities and the antitrust
law.
The
Supreme Court held in Hydrolevel Corp. v. The American Society
of Mechanical Engineers, 456 U.S. 556 (1982), that a non-profit
organization may be held liable for treble damages under the
antitrust laws if the officers of one of its committees, as
part of conspiracy with others, issue an anti-competitive
"interpretation" (or misinterpretation) of one of
the organization's standards for the committee officer's own
purpose or for the purpose or benefit of his company. The
holding of the Supreme Court may be properly viewed as a limited
one resulting from the particularly unscrupulous acts of two
individuals who were officers of an American Society of Mechanical
Engineers ("ASME") subcommittee. These individuals
gave a written opinion on ASME stationery, and with the apparent
approval of the subcommittee as a whole. The opinion in effect
indicated that a "low-water fuel cutoff" manufactured
and sold by plaintiff Hydrolevel was in violation of ASME's
code. One of the two subcommittee officers was a vice president
of McDonnell & Miller, Inc., the major producer of low-water
fuel cutoffs.
While
this case arose only because of clearly imprudent and unlawful
actions by only several members of a very large industry association,
it is critical that similar associations use this case as
a reminder of their responsibilities to fairly serve their
member companies and the public as well. Of particular interest
are the following antitrust exposures of an industry association
which were discussed by the Supreme Court in its decision:
A.
A standard-setting organization such as ASME has the opportunity
for anti-competitive activity by its members, or the members'
employees. The court stated:
"The facts of this case dramatically illustrate the power
of ASME's agents to restrain competition. M & M instigated
the submission of a single inquiry to an ASME subcommittee.
For its efforts, M&M secured a mere 'unofficial' response
authored by a single ASME subcommittee chairman. Yet the force
of ASME's reputation is so great that M&M was able to
use that one 'unofficial' response to injure seriously the
business of a competitor."
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B.
The courts will likely hold the industry association liable
for antitrust violations committed by its members under the
theory that such members, or their employees, had "apparent
authority". Such liability will occur even though the
industry association was unaware of the improper acts and
did not formally ratify these improper acts of several of
its members.
C.
The fact that the industry association does not benefit from
the anti-competitive acts of its agents is not a defense.
D.
The fact that an industry association is a nonprofit organization
is not a defense to an antitrust violation.
The
Supreme Court stated in conclusion:
"When ASME's agents act in its name, they are able
to affect the lives of large numbers of people and the competitive
fortunes of businesses throughout the country. By holding
ASME liable under the antitrust laws for the antitrust violations
of its agents committed with apparent authority, we recognize
the important role of ASME and its agents in the economy,
and we help to ensure that standard-setting organizations
will act with care when they permit their agents to speak
for them."
The concepts of consensus and due process used to develop
and revise standards must be used in the area of standard
interpretation. There was no claim that the ASME code was
anti-competitive. It was the lack of the procedures designed
to assure consensus and due process in the interpretation
that gave rise to the problem.
The
possibility of personal liability and member liability for
those who participate in voluntary standards has in no way
been changed by the decision in Hydrolevel vs. ASME. Had ASME's
procedures been different for its interpretive process, the
court might not have applied liability to ASME itself.
VII. GPA Policy
GPA
shall continue to apply written procedures to govern the interpretation
process, and the setting of standards, tests, formulae, etc.
Such procedures shall insure that adequate due process and
consensus exist as to any given interpretation.
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